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“And	  I	  shall	  have	  peace	  there,	  for	  peace	  comes	  dropping	  slow…”	  (Yeats,	  1908)	  
	  
Introduction	  In	  1908	  when	  W.B.	  Yeats	  was	  detailing	  his	  desire	  of	  a	  personal	  exodus	  to	  Sligo2	  he	  was	  not	  to	  know	  that	  taken	  in	  isolation	  his	  words	  could	  readily	  describe	  the	  elongated	  peace	  process	  the	  island	  he	  loved	  so	  well	  was	  still	  to	  be	  going	  through	  over	  a	  century	  later.	  For	  many	  external	  observers	  a	  post-­‐Good	  Friday	  Agreement3	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  the	  epitome	  of	  a	  country	  enjoying	  a	  newfound	  peace.	  The	  reality	  though	  is	  that	  this	  is	  a	  peace	  still	  ‘dropping	  slow.’	  In	  the	  years	  that	  have	  passed	  since	  the	  historic	  signing	  of	  the	  Agreement	  Northern	  Irish	  politics	  has	  gradually	  attempted	  to	  normalise.	  However,	  the	  spectre	  of	  The	  
Troubles	  still	  lingers	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  many.	  The	  questions	  of	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  past	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  resolved,	  as	  are	  those	  of	  how	  to	  properly	  shape	  the	  future.	  The	  constant	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  Provisional	  IRA	  no	  longer	  has	  a	  presence	  in	  Northern	  Irish	  society.	  This	  has	  though	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  more	  sporadic,	  but	  demonstrably	  significant,	  violence	  perpetrated	  by	  an	  array	  of	  dissident	  successors	  (Horgan	  and	  Morrison,	  2011).	  While	  many	  assessments	  of	  the	  Northern	  Irish	  conflict	  understandably	  focus	  on	  the	  20th	  century	  violence	  and	  its	  subsequent	  peace	  process	  of	  the	  1990s	  the	  present	  chapter	  will	  evaluate	  a	  21st	  century	  Northern	  Ireland.	  It	  will	  assess	  some	  of	  the	  key	  developments	  and	  roads	  blocks	  that	  have	  been	  faced	  in	  the	  present	  and	  recent	  past.	  Within	  this	  there	  will	  be	  a	  demonstration	  of	  how	  a	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  focus	  is	  required	  to	  understand	  the	  problems	  still	  facing	  the	  people	  of	  Northern	  Ireland.	  It	  is	  only	  with	  this	  level	  of	  true	  understanding	  that	  we	  can	  have	  any	  hope	  of	  finding	  a	  genuine	  resolution	  to	  the	  enduring	  conflict.	  This	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  one	  needs	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  terrorism	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  clear	  resolution.	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  will	  focus	  on	  one	  of	  the	  key	  non-­‐terrorist	  activities	  of	  paramilitary	  groups	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  sectarian	  divide,	  namely	  the	  continuing	  threat	  of	  violent	  vigilantism.	  Therefore	  from	  an	  academic	  point	  of	  view	  we	  must	  also	  look	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  terrorism	  analysis	  to	  achieve	  this	  necessary	  understanding.	  	  
Beyond	  Terrorism	  For	  too	  long	  terrorism	  research	  has	  been	  constrained	  by	  the	  hunt	  for	  a	  true	  definition.	  Endless	  articles	  have	  been	  dedicated	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  an	  agreeable	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  term	  and	  the	  actions	  it	  suggests.	  However,	  the	  case	  of	  Northern	  Irish	  paramilitary	  groups	  and	  many	  other	  national	  and	  international	  terrorist	  groups	  have	  demonstrated	  how	  we	  need	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  terrorism	  to	  truly	  understand	  these	  groups	  and	  the	  individuals	  who	  declare	  their	  membership.	  We	  must	  be	  clear	  that	  by	  labelling	  a	  group	  or	  individual	  as	  ‘terrorist’	  does	  not	  automatically	  ascribe	  that	  all	  of	  their	  actions,	  be	  they	  legal	  or	  
illegal,	  should	  be	  classified	  as	  an	  act	  of	  ‘terrorism.’	  By	  applying	  the	  same	  logic	  of	  labeling	  an	  individual,	  organisation	  or	  state	  as	  a	  non-­‐terrorist	  actor	  does	  not	  automatically	  deem	  all	  their	  actions	  to	  be	  non-­‐terrorist	  by	  definition.	  Terrorism	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  employment	  of	  violence	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  repeated	  violence	  by	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  intent	  on	  bring	  about	  a	  political	  effect.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  action	  is	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  state	  of	  fear	  in	  a	  wider	  audience	  than	  the	  direct	  physical	  victims	  of	  the	  initial	  act	  or	  threat	  of	  violence	  A	  terrorist	  incident	  should	  be	  defined	  by	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  violence	  to	  bring	  about	  political	  effect,	  not	  by	  the	  specific	  motive	  of	  the	  perpetrators.	  Therefore	  terrorism	  is	  a	  tactic	  that	  can	  be	  employed	  by	  any	  individual	  or	  group,	  whether	  they	  are	  state	  or	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  	  	  Upon	  analysis	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  acts	  that	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  terrorism	  are	  but	  intermittent	  peaks	  within	  a	  group’s	  overall	  existence,	  and	  an	  individual’s	  overall	  membership.	  Therefore	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  the	  most	  complete	  understanding	  of	  these	  groups	  and	  their	  activities	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  we	  must	  also	  understand	  the	  troughs	  of	  non-­‐terrorist	  actions	  (Morrison,	  2013).	  While	  the	  bombings,	  assassinations	  and	  other	  attacks	  understandably	  garner	  the	  news	  headlines	  there	  is	  much	  more	  to	  a	  terrorist	  existence.	  To	  gain	  that	  true	  understanding	  we	  are	  all	  striving	  for	  we	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  range	  of	  non-­‐terrorist	  activity	  these	  groups	  and	  individuals	  are	  engaged	  in.	  Terrorism	  research	  is	  about	  more	  than	  terrorism.	  It	  is	  also	  about	  understanding	  how	  individuals	  move	  from	  being	  rank	  and	  file	  members	  to	  leadership	  figures.	  It	  is	  about	  investigating	  why	  and	  how	  members	  stay	  affiliated	  to	  a	  group	  at	  a	  time	  of	  ceasefire.	  It	  is	  about	  analysing	  the	  non-­‐violent	  political	  campaigning	  of	  the	  groups	  and	  the	  statements	  they	  put	  out.	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  about	  understanding	  the	  ordinary	  criminality	  of	  the	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  the	  political	  criminality	  of	  the	  terrorism	  they	  partake	  in.	  Across	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Northern	  Irish	  conflict	  individuals	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  paramilitary	  divide	  have	  engaged	  in	  criminal	  acts	  from	  violent	  vigilantism	  to	  extortion,	  smuggling	  to	  intimidation.	  These	  acts	  have	  targeted	  external	  communities.	  However,	  the	  most	  consistent	  victims	  are	  the	  very	  communities	  these	  groups	  claim	  to	  represent.	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  there	  will	  be	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  modern	  day	  vigilantism	  and	  the	  questions	  this	  raises	  on	  how	  we	  should	  be	  analysing	  terrorism	  and	  the	  other	  illegal	  activities	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  terrorist	  groups	  and	  actors.	  	  Parallel	  to	  the	  illegal	  activity	  we	  must	  also	  appreciate	  the	  equal	  importance	  of	  a	  group’s	  activity	  external	  from	  both	  their	  terrorist	  and	  criminal	  actions.	  We	  must	  appreciate	  their	  legal	  activity.	  By	  striving	  to	  achieve	  this	  we	  provide	  ourselves	  with	  a	  greater	  opportunity	  to	  attain	  a	  more	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  the	  groups,	  which	  in	  turn	  allows	  for	  a	  greater	  chance	  of	  success	  in	  countering	  their	  actions.	  By	  looking	  beyond	  their	  violent	  and	  illegal	  activity	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  these	  terrorist	  groups	  should	  be	  considered	  similar	  to	  political	  interest	  organisations,	  the	  key	  difference	  being	  their	  utilisation	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals.	  When	  taking	  into	  consideration	  this	  overall	  understanding	  it	  is	  paramount	  that	  we	  not	  only	  look	  at	  the	  ‘headline’	  or	  high-­‐end	  objectives	  of	  the	  groups.	  It	  is	  vital	  that	  there	  is	  also	  an	  appreciation	  that	  there	  are	  more	  immediate	  and	  lower-­‐end	  objectives	  that	  similarly	  need	  to	  be	  understood.	  Political	  organisational	  theory	  details	  that	  the	  immediate	  goal	  of	  any	  political	  organisation,	  terrorist	  groups	  
included,	  is	  to	  maintain	  organisational	  survival	  (Crenshaw,	  1985;	  Oots,	  1989;	  Morrison,	  2014).	  It	  is	  only	  when	  this	  survival	  is	  confirmed	  that	  the	  groups	  can	  then	  aim	  to	  achieve	  their	  ultimate	  objectives	  be	  that	  a	  united	  Ireland	  or	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  a	  Northern	  Irish	  state	  with	  an	  enduring	  tie	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Through	  this	  chapter	  there	  is	  an	  appreciation	  of	  this	  need	  to	  look	  below	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  ultimate	  objectives	  to	  truly	  grasp	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  the	  terrorist	  groups.	  It	  will	  aim	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  persistent	  struggle	  for	  survival,	  relevance	  and	  legitimacy	  that	  the	  Irish	  Republican	  paramilitary	  groups	  have	  endeavoured	  for	  across	  the	  decades	  is	  being	  reflected	  in	  the	  modern	  day	  actions	  of	  their	  non-­‐terrorist	  foes	  of	  the	  unionist	  establishment	  in	  a	  modern	  day	  Northern	  Ireland.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Marc	  Sageman	  has	  recently	  asked	  whether	  terrorism	  research	  has	  stagnated	  (Sageman,	  2014).	  In	  his	  deeply	  critical	  assessment	  of	  the	  area	  he	  states	  that	  we	  are	  no	  nearer	  to	  answering	  the	  question	  “what	  leads	  a	  person	  to	  political	  violence?”	  (Ibid,	  p.1)	  While	  this	  article	  raises	  some	  salient	  points	  it	  fails	  to	  appreciate	  the	  overall	  breadth	  of	  what	  terrorism	  studies	  should,	  and	  does,	  encompass.	  By	  insinuating	  that	  the	  stagnation	  of	  this	  area	  of	  study	  is	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  failure	  to	  answer	  this	  one	  question	  it	  mistakenly	  implies	  that	  the	  sole	  goal	  of	  any	  terrorism	  researcher	  must	  be	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  this.	  If	  one	  was	  to	  abide	  by	  this	  notion	  it	  is	  then	  that	  the	  terrorism	  research	  will	  stagnate.	  There	  is	  a	  range	  of	  different	  questions	  which	  need	  to	  be	  answered	  by	  research,	  “what	  leads	  a	  person	  to	  political	  violence?”	  is	  only	  one	  of	  them.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  questions	  to	  answer,	  potentially	  the	  most	  important.	  However,	  there	  are	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  vital	  questions	  that	  we	  are	  paying	  little	  to	  no	  attention	  to	  (See	  Schmid,	  2011).	  Therefore	  the	  stagnation	  of	  research	  on	  the	  topic	  will	  not	  be	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  failure	  to	  answer	  that	  one	  question,	  it	  will	  be	  as	  a	  result	  of	  remaining	  blinkered	  in	  the	  scope	  and	  breadth	  of	  the	  potential	  questions.	  This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  some	  of	  these	  topics	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  emphasis	  of	  the	  analysis	  will	  be	  predominantly	  on	  the	  Irish	  Republican	  paramilitaries.	  The	  sources	  used	  throughout	  the	  analysis	  will	  be	  first-­‐hand	  interviews	  with	  leadership	  and	  rank	  and	  file	  members	  of	  the	  organisations	  as	  well	  as	  primary	  documents	  and	  statements	  released	  by	  relevant	  individuals	  and	  organisations.	  With	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  nature	  of	  Northern	  Irish	  politics	  and	  security	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  chapter	  is	  update	  as	  of	  April	  11th	  2014.	  	  
The	  Continued	  Journey	  to	  Peace	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  The	  silencing	  of	  Northern	  Irish	  paramilitarism	  has	  been	  a	  long	  and	  slow	  journey.	  It	  has	  required	  huge	  sacrifices	  and	  leaps	  of	  faith	  by	  all	  of	  those	  involved.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Good	  Friday	  Agreement	  in	  1998	  the	  international	  community,	  and	  many	  academics,	  rejoiced	  and	  then	  turned	  their	  focus	  elsewhere.	  The	  enduring	  conflict	  had	  been	  brought	  to	  a	  close.	  However,	  the	  reality	  on	  the	  ground	  has	  been	  much	  different.	  As	  with	  any	  post	  conflict	  environment	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  structure	  agreed	  is	  as	  difficult,	  if	  not	  more	  so	  than,	  the	  process	  reaching	  agreement	  on	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  these	  structures.	  Each	  of	  the	  relevant	  parties	  must	  ensure	  the	  backing	  of	  their	  respective	  membership,	  support	  bases	  and	  the	  wider	  society	  before	  they	  can	  sign	  up	  to	  any	  restructuring.	  A	  leadership	  in	  agreement	  with	  any	  significant	  
change	  is	  only	  beneficial	  to	  the	  process	  if	  they	  come	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  base.	  A	  leadership	  moving	  prior	  to	  gaining	  this	  backing	  base	  leaves	  their	  party	  open	  to	  factionalisation,	  de-­‐legimisation	  and	  potential	  expiration.	  Throughout	  The	  Troubles	  and	  even	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  Northern	  Ireland	  each	  of	  the	  relevant	  organisations,	  both	  paramilitary	  and	  political,	  have	  moved	  with	  a	  frustrating	  degree	  of	  reticence	  and	  gradualism.	  No	  party	  wished	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  giving	  up	  more	  ground	  than	  their	  opponents	  or	  to	  be	  selling	  out	  on	  the	  core	  ideals	  of	  their	  party	  or	  organisation.	  	  One	  of	  the	  great	  successes	  of	  the	  Northern	  Irish	  peace	  process	  has	  been	  the	  politicisation	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Provisional	  Irish	  Republican	  Movement.	  Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gerry	  Adams,	  Martin	  McGuinness	  and	  others	  the	  Provisionals	  have	  moved	  from	  being	  one	  of	  the	  longest	  serving	  insurgent	  movements	  to	  being	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  political	  establishment	  of	  Northern	  Ireland.	  But	  this	  was	  not	  an	  overnight	  politicisation.	  The	  multitude	  of	  strategic	  changes	  necessary	  to	  reach	  this	  point	  were	  spread	  across	  decades	  of	  violence.	  It	  was	  the	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  gradualism	  of	  their	  politicisation,	  interspersed	  with	  horrific	  acts	  of	  terrorism	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  violence,	  which	  enabled	  them	  to	  bring	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  membership	  and	  support	  with	  them	  away	  from	  violence.	  The	  slow	  pace	  of	  their	  strategic	  change	  has	  brought	  them	  from	  the	  paramilitary	  advocates	  of	  absolute	  abstentionism4	  to	  a	  peaceful	  political	  organisation	  sharing	  power	  in	  Stormont5	  with	  the	  Democratic	  Unionist	  Party	  (the	  DUP),	  and	  potentially	  the	  future	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Dail	  Eireann.6	  They	  have	  moved	  from	  a	  terrorist	  organisation	  that	  readily	  targeted	  the	  extended	  British	  royal	  family7	  to	  one	  whose	  leadership8	  is	  comfortable	  not	  only	  meeting	  and	  shaking	  hands	  with	  the	  Queen	  but	  also	  joining	  a	  toast	  to	  the	  health	  and	  happiness	  of	  her	  and	  her	  husband	  the	  Duke	  of	  Edinburgh.9	  This	  is	  an	  organisation	  that	  for	  generations	  would	  not	  recognise,	  and	  would	  actively	  target,	  the	  Royal	  Ulster	  Constabulary	  (RUC)	  and	  who	  now	  sit	  on	  the	  policing	  board	  of	  their	  successors	  the	  Police	  Service	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  (PSNI).	  	  In	  the	  build	  up	  these	  historic	  strategic	  changes	  the	  leadership	  repeatedly	  demonstrated	  their	  ability	  and	  willingness	  to	  postpone	  and	  back	  away	  if	  they	  believed	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  majority	  support	  of	  their	  base.	  This	  was	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  their	  legitimacy	  and	  strength	  within	  the	  community	  and	  to	  protect	  the	  survival	  of	  their	  leadership	  and	  the	  direction	  they	  wished	  to	  take	  the	  organisation.	  They	  were	  aiming	  to	  dampen	  the	  resolve	  of	  internal	  dissenters	  and	  to	  discourage	  others	  from	  siding	  with	  those	  speaking	  out	  against	  them.	  In	  essence	  they	  were	  attempting	  to	  keep	  the	  Republican	  Movement	  intact.	  Under	  this	  guise	  they	  consistently	  showed	  their	  willingness	  to	  leave	  the	  negotiating	  table	  and	  resume	  their	  armed	  campaign.	  However,	  when	  necessary	  they	  also	  showed	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  bold	  and	  historically	  significant	  strategic	  changes,	  vital	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  enormity	  of	  these	  changes	  was	  clearly	  stated	  by	  the	  former	  public	  relations	  officer	  of	  the	  Provisionals	  Danny	  Morrison.	  	  
You	  know	  if	  you	  had	  said	  walking	  around	  the	  place	  in	  the	  yard	  
August	  1994	  “we’re	  going	  to	  be	  supporting	  the	  amendment	  of	  
Articles	  2	  and	  310,	  ending	  the	  Northern	  abstentionism,	  
supporting	  a	  new	  police	  service,	  the	  IRA	  is	  going	  to	  first	  of	  all	  
open	  its	  dumps,	  its	  precious	  dumps,	  you	  know	  these	  weapons	  
that	  had	  been	  painstakingly	  smuggled	  into	  the	  country,	  open	  
its	  dumps,	  then	  seal	  its	  dumps	  forever,	  and	  that	  Martin	  
McGuinness	  was	  going	  to	  end	  up	  in	  government	  with	  Ian	  
Paisley”.	  	  I	  mean	  that	  was	  so	  fantastic,	  and	  fabulous,	  if	  you	  
had	  said	  that	  to	  me	  in	  July	  1994	  I	  would	  have	  been	  sending	  for	  
the	  men	  in	  white	  coats.	  (Interview	  with	  Danny	  Morrison,	  January	  21st,	  2008)	  	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  gradual	  nature	  of	  these	  changes	  has	  been	  emphasised	  by	  all	  sides,	  even	  those	  dissidents	  who	  are	  opposed	  to	  the	  modern	  day	  direction	  of	  mainstream	  Irish	  Republicanism.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  following	  quote	  from	  Francie	  Mackey	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  32	  County	  Sovereignty	  Movement,	  which	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  political	  wing	  of	  the	  Real	  IRA,	  and	  now	  the	  New	  IRA.	  	  
It	  was	  broken	  down	  to	  single	  issue	  and	  that	  was	  the	  only	  issue	  
being	  dealt	  with,	  as	  if	  all	  of	  the	  issues	  weren’t	  co-­‐related.	  	  
That	  allowed	  the	  leadership	  the	  breathing	  space	  throughout	  
the	  whole	  period	  to	  go	  that	  one	  step	  closer.	  (Interview	  with	  Francie	  Mackey,	  June	  25th,	  2008)	  	  With	  the	  magnitude	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  movement	  there	  was	  bound	  to	  be	  dissent,	  and	  it	  was	  the	  task	  of	  the	  leadership	  to	  weaken	  the	  support	  of	  the	  dissenters	  and	  to	  prevent	  any	  threat	  to	  their	  leadership	  or	  competition	  for	  their	  membership	  and	  support.	  To	  a	  large	  degree	  they	  succeeded.	  However,	  as	  is	  echoed	  throughout	  Irish	  Republican	  history	  on	  a	  number	  of	  separate	  occasions	  the	  organisation	  split	  as	  a	  result	  of	  to	  the	  leadership’s	  gradual	  politicisation	  and	  continued	  involvement	  in	  the	  peace	  process.	  While	  these	  splits	  proved	  to	  be	  vital	  in	  the	  continued	  politicisation	  of	  the	  movement	  they	  also	  provided	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  largest	  threat	  to	  Northern	  Irish	  security	  today,	  the	  violent	  dissident	  Irish	  Republicans.11	  	  	  Throughout	  the	  peace	  process	  it	  was	  the	  snail-­‐paced	  developments	  on	  all	  sides	  that	  proved	  most	  frustrating	  for	  many	  of	  those	  both	  observing	  and	  involved.	  However,	  there	  was	  an	  unfortunate	  necessity	  for	  this	  slowness.	  For	  a	  conflict	  that	  had	  defined	  a	  country	  for	  close	  to	  thirty	  years	  none	  of	  these	  changes	  could	  or	  should	  have	  been	  implemented	  over	  night.	  It	  was	  more	  important	  to	  implement	  at	  the	  right	  time	  rather	  than	  the	  soonest	  time.	  In	  the	  years	  after	  the	  historic	  Good	  Friday	  Agreement	  it	  took	  time	  for	  a	  normalised	  Northern	  Ireland	  to	  take	  hold.	  From	  the	  game-­‐changing	  involvement	  of	  the	  DUP,	  to	  the	  acceptance	  on	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  PSNI,	  to	  the	  devolution	  of	  justice	  powers	  each	  change	  needed	  to	  be	  eased	  through	  gradually	  to	  guarantee	  permanence	  rather	  than	  immediacy.	  There	  have	  been	  many	  apparent	  fault-­‐starts	  along	  the	  way,	  with	  the	  Stormont	  government	  more	  often	  dissolved	  than	  devolved	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  However,	  the	  necessary	  foundational	  institutional	  and	  societal	  changes	  implemented	  are	  now	  starting	  to	  take	  hold	  and	  becoming	  normality.	  With	  this	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  moving	  forward	  with	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  the	  long	  and	  arduous	  process,	  a	  process	  that	  sees	  the	  country	  having	  to	  deal	  
with	  outstanding	  issues	  yet	  to	  be	  resolved.	  With	  this	  must	  be	  expected	  a	  further	  stage	  of	  gradual	  change	  and	  frustrating	  negotiations	  on	  all	  sides.	  	  Modern	  day	  Northern	  Irish	  politics	  has	  seen	  the	  formerly	  unimaginable	  situation	  of	  the	  previously	  sworn	  enemies	  of	  Sinn	  Fein	  and	  the	  DUP	  sharing	  power.	  The	  membership,	  ethos	  and	  ideologies	  of	  these	  two	  parties	  could	  not	  be	  more	  different.	  However,	  as	  with	  all	  political	  parties	  their	  immediate	  aim	  is	  the	  same.	  Before	  they	  can	  achieve	  their	  purposive	  goals	  they	  must	  first	  guarantee	  organisational	  survival.	  As	  has	  been	  briefly	  documented	  above	  for	  Sinn	  Fein	  and	  the	  wider	  Republican	  Movement	  this	  has	  seen	  them	  move	  from	  paramilitary	  to	  political	  activity	  in	  a	  gradual	  and	  deliberate	  manner	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  maintaining	  majority	  support	  at	  each	  strategic	  turn.	  As	  much	  as	  they	  would	  like	  to	  emphasise	  their	  differences	  similar	  has	  been	  true	  within	  all	  strands	  of	  unionism.	  The	  leadership	  of	  mainstream	  unionism	  within	  the	  DUP	  and	  the	  Ulster	  Unionist	  Party	  (UUP)	  have	  similarly	  brought	  their	  communities	  a	  direction	  that	  for	  many	  was	  unimaginable	  and	  even	  abhorrent.	  While	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  strong	  paramilitary	  past	  to	  move	  away	  from	  they	  have	  had	  significant	  ideological,	  strategic	  and	  emotional	  milestones	  to	  overcome.	  They	  have	  largely	  convinced	  their	  community	  of	  the	  necessity	  to	  accept	  the	  legitimate	  role	  that	  Irish	  Republicans,	  and	  more	  importantly	  their	  former	  paramilitary	  representatives	  of	  Sinn	  Fein,	  have	  to	  play	  in	  the	  political	  establishment,	  and	  shaping	  the	  future,	  of	  Northern	  Ireland.	  This	  has	  not	  been	  an	  easy	  task	  and	  one	  that	  as	  with	  the	  changes	  implemented	  by	  the	  Provisional	  Republican	  Movement	  has	  taken	  time.	  It	  was	  only	  recently	  in	  2006	  where	  it	  was	  a	  huge	  milestone	  for	  the	  DUP	  to	  even	  enter	  negotiations	  involving	  Sinn	  Fein.	  We	  now	  see	  them	  sharing	  power	  with	  the	  party	  they	  formerly	  despised.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  post-­‐conflict	  society	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  has	  much	  to	  contend	  with	  and	  resolve.	  In	  2013	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  further	  negotiations	  were	  necessary	  on	  some	  of	  the	  key	  outstanding	  issues.	  There	  were	  three	  key	  areas	  identified	  for	  focus:	  	   1. Parades,	  select	  commemorations	  and	  related	  protests	  2. Flags	  and	  emblems	  3. Contending	  with	  the	  past.	  	  The	  former	  US	  diplomat	  Richard	  Haass	  and	  former	  deputy	  national	  security	  adviser	  to	  the	  president	  of	  the	  United	  States	  on	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  Meghan	  O’Sullivan	  were	  invited	  to	  chair	  cross	  party	  talks	  on	  bringing	  about	  resolution	  to	  these	  issues.	  Under	  their	  guidance	  a	  number	  of	  iterations	  of	  proposed	  agreements	  were	  authored.	  However,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  present	  proposals	  that	  were	  agreeable	  to	  all	  parties.	  Their	  final	  attempt	  came	  on	  New	  Year’s	  Eve	  2013.12	  During	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  the	  negotiations	  it	  was	  externally	  revealed	  that	  during	  the	  peace	  process	  the	  UK	  government	  had	  notified	  approximately	  200	  republican	  paramilitary	  suspects	  that	  they	  were	  no	  longer	  under	  risk	  of	  arrest.	  This	  controversy	  about	  the	  ‘on	  the	  runs’	  led	  to	  the	  UUP,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Mike	  Nesbitt,	  pulling	  out	  of	  all	  talks.	  Ultimately	  with	  the	  final	  proposals	  tabled	  it	  was	  only	  Sinn	  Fein	  and	  the	  nationalist	  Social	  Democratic	  and	  Labour	  Party	  (SDLP)	  that	  signed	  up	  to	  the	  agreement.	  The	  DUP,	  UUP	  and	  the	  cross-­‐community	  
Alliance	  Party	  failed	  to	  fully	  endorse	  it.	  	  In	  the	  months	  since	  the	  failure	  to	  reach	  agreement	  Haass	  has	  warned	  that	  	  
…in	  that	  kind	  of	  environment	  –	  particularly	  where	  politics	  are	  
not	  shown	  to	  be	  making	  progress	  –	  alienation	  will	  continue	  to	  
fester	  and	  violence,	  I	  fear,	  could	  very	  well	  re-­‐emerge	  as	  a	  
characteristic	  of	  daily	  life.	  (BBC	  News,	  March	  12th,	  2013)	  
	  Haass’	  warnings	  were	  stark	  and	  understandable,	  but	  also	  necessary.	  As	  will	  be	  portrayed	  in	  the	  next	  section	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  returning	  to	  violence.	  However,	  when	  analysing	  the	  situation	  one	  must	  appreciate	  and	  understand	  the	  context.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  were	  issues	  related	  with	  each	  section	  of	  the	  proposals	  that	  were	  disagreeable	  to	  the	  parties.	  However,	  they	  are	  not	  unresolvable.	  	  As	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  past	  the	  Northern	  Irish	  parties,	  similar	  to	  all	  political	  parties,	  will	  only	  agree	  to	  negotiated	  settlements	  when	  the	  timing	  is	  right	  for	  them.	  They	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  guarantee	  support	  from	  their	  base.	  If	  they	  do	  not	  achieve	  this	  they	  risk	  weakening	  the	  support	  and	  relevance	  of	  their	  parties	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  resolutions.	  With	  the	  controversy	  about	  the	  ‘on	  the	  runs’	  and	  the	  rising	  influence	  of	  political	  alternatives13	  to	  mainstream	  unionism	  within	  their	  communities	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  agreements	  may	  not	  have	  been	  appropriate.	  Without	  the	  guarantee	  of	  support	  from	  their	  communities	  not	  only	  would	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  parties	  have	  been	  weakened	  but	  so	  too	  would	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  any	  agreements.	  Therefore	  as	  always	  with	  the	  Northern	  Irish	  peace-­‐process	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  sentiments	  of	  any	  agreement	  that	  are	  important	  but	  equally	  important	  is	  the	  timing.	  This	  should	  not	  be	  construed	  as	  an	  apology	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  stagnant	  talks.	  It	  has	  been	  written	  to	  portray	  the	  importance	  of	  both	  timing	  and	  context	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  Northern	  Ireland.	  	  
The	  Enduring	  Residue	  of	  Violence	  In	  his	  March	  2014	  address	  to	  US	  Congressional	  subcommittee	  of	  foreign	  relations	  Richard	  Haass	  warned	  that	  ‘violence…could	  very	  well	  re-­‐emerge	  as	  a	  characteristic	  of	  daily	  life’	  (BBC	  News,	  March	  24th,	  2014).	  While	  the	  loyalist	  gangs	  have	  been	  recently	  reinvigorated	  the	  most	  persistent	  and	  serious	  threat	  still	  comes	  from	  dissident	  Irish	  Republican	  groups	  (See	  Horgan,	  2013;	  Tonge,	  2014;	  Currie	  and	  Taylor,	  2011;	  Morrison,	  2014).	  Since	  2007,	  and	  Sinn	  Fein’s	  acceptance	  of	  the	  PSNI	  there	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  rise	  in	  violent	  dissident	  republican	  activity	  (Horgan	  and	  Morrison,	  2011)	  Groups	  such	  as	  the	  Continuity	  IRA,	  Real	  IRA,	  Oglaigh	  na	  hEireann	  and	  the	  newly	  emerging	  New	  IRA	  have	  been	  responsible	  for	  the	  recent	  rise	  of	  terrorist	  activity	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  They	  have	  targeted	  the	  PSNI,	  the	  British	  Army,	  MI5	  and	  other	  symbols	  of	  the	  ‘British	  security	  establishment’	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  They	  have	  similarly	  attempted	  to	  disrupt	  the	  normalisation	  of	  political	  life	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  with	  bombs	  and	  hoax	  devices	  targeting	  the	  towns,	  villages	  and	  transport	  networks	  of	  Northern	  Ireland.	  However,	  while	  these	  groups	  are	  justifiably	  labelled	  as	  terrorist	  organisations	  there	  most	  persistent	  violent	  activity	  are	  not	  acts	  of	  terrorism,	  but	  acts	  of	  vigilantism	  targeting	  the	  very	  communities	  they	  claim	  to	  represent	  (Horgan	  and	  Morrison,	  2011,	  p.651).	  	  
Throughout	  the	  history	  of	  Irish	  Republicanism	  parallel	  to	  terrorism	  has	  been	  persistent	  levels	  of	  violent	  vigilantism.	  Within	  the	  Provisional	  IRA’s	  training	  and	  induction	  manual	  known	  as	  The	  Green	  Book	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  one	  of	  the	  key	  elements	  of	  their	  guerrilla	  strategy	  was	  	  
…defending	  the	  war	  of	  liberation	  by	  punishing	  criminals,	  
collaborators	  and	  informers	  (The	  IRA,	  1977,	  p.8)	  	  Across	  the	  decades	  this	  has	  seen	  the	  persistent	  targeting	  of	  suspected	  anti-­‐social	  youths,	  joyriders,	  petty	  thiefs,	  drug	  dealers,	  paedophiles	  and	  other	  criminals	  as	  well	  as	  those	  portrayed	  as	  collaborators	  or	  informers.14	  The	  punishments	  inflicted	  ranged	  from	  warnings	  and	  curfews,	  to	  the	  more	  severe	  punishment	  beatings	  and	  shootings	  to	  the	  finality	  of	  expulsions	  and	  assassinations	  (Silke,	  1998).	  Unlike	  their	  terrorist	  activity	  this	  ‘self-­‐policing’	  has	  mainly	  targeted	  those	  communities	  they	  claim	  to	  represent;	  the	  working-­‐class	  nationalist	  communities	  of	  Northern	  Ireland.	  Upon	  analysis	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  activity	  is	  clear	  for	  all	  to	  see.	  These	  groups	  seek	  power	  and	  control	  within	  their	  communities.	  They	  wish	  to	  undermine	  the	  police	  and	  the	  wider	  security	  and	  political	  establishment.	  Their	  aim	  is	  to	  make	  themselves	  indispensable	  within	  the	  community,	  and	  through	  this	  gain	  both	  passive	  and	  active	  support	  for	  their	  broader	  paramilitary	  campaign.	  Finally	  it	  provides	  them	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  eradicate	  potential	  internal	  and	  external	  threats	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  their	  organisation.	  	  Across	  criminological	  research	  it	  has	  been	  consistently	  shown	  that	  vigilantism	  succeeds	  in	  gaining	  significant	  community	  support	  when	  there	  are	  low	  levels	  of	  confidence	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  (Haas,	  de	  Keijser	  and	  Bruinsma,	  2014).	  In	  the	  report	  published	  by	  the	  Patten	  Commission	  which	  provided	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  PSNI	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  police	  within	  the	  Catholic	  community	  was	  less	  than	  50%	  (The	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Policing	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  1999).	  This	  has	  historically	  allowed	  for	  paramilitary	  groups	  to	  operate	  within	  these	  communities	  without	  significant	  fear	  of	  being	  reported	  to	  the	  police.	  Throughout	  
The	  Troubles	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  the	  levels	  of	  support	  within	  republican	  communities	  for	  vigilantism	  ranged	  from	  a	  low	  of	  24%	  to	  a	  high	  of	  77%	  (Silke,	  2000).	  	  It	  was	  to	  be	  some	  of	  these	  supporters	  who	  would	  go	  on	  to	  provide	  safe	  houses	  for	  weapons	  and	  members	  attempting	  to	  avoid	  police	  capture.	  	  	  Each	  of	  the	  modern-­‐day	  dissident	  groups	  has	  continued	  this	  tradition	  of	  ‘community	  policing.’	  This	  allows	  for	  them	  to	  bolster	  their	  message	  of	  an	  illegitimate	  police	  force.	  In	  their	  minds	  the	  PSNI	  similar	  to	  their	  predecessors	  the	  RUC	  is	  a	  British	  police	  force	  operating	  in	  Ireland.	  They	  are	  an	  occupying	  force	  who	  has	  no	  right	  to	  police	  the	  republican	  communities	  of	  the	  six	  counties	  of	  Northern	  Ireland.	  Through	  their	  statements	  and	  vigilante	  activity	  they	  continuously	  attempt	  to	  undermine	  the	  PSNI	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  public	  and	  to	  portray	  them	  not	  only	  as	  an	  illegitimate	  and	  unrepresentative	  force,	  but	  an	  incapable	  one	  at	  that.	  This	  has	  been	  coupled	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  faith	  in	  the	  police	  to	  eradicate	  community	  crime,	  especially	  drug	  dealing.	  This	  lack	  of	  faith	  in	  the	  police	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pertinent	  issues	  remaining	  in	  the	  peace	  process.	  A	  history	  of	  perceived	  injustice	  is	  hard	  for	  many	  to	  forget.	  
	  
I	  think	  that	  the	  probably	  most	  difficult	  one	  of	  all,	  and	  one	  that	  
people	  still	  haven’t	  got	  around	  is	  support	  for	  the	  PSNI.	  	  I	  think	  
people	  do	  it	  in	  dribs	  and	  drabs	  and	  they	  do	  it	  in	  isolation.	  	  You	  
know	  there	  is	  no	  one	  flocking	  to	  join	  the	  PSNI,	  although	  I	  
would	  say	  there	  are	  individuals,	  maybe	  Catholics	  outside	  of	  
West	  Belfast	  who	  are	  joining	  them.	  	  And	  fair	  play	  to	  them.	  	  I	  
think	  that	  as	  the	  PSNI	  changes	  in	  composition,	  as	  it	  becomes	  
our	  PSNI,	  and	  we	  have	  to	  defend	  it,	  and	  we	  have	  to	  promote	  it,	  
have	  to	  work	  with	  it.	  (Interview	  with	  Danny	  Morrison)	  	  Since	  2009	  the	  most	  persistent	  vigilante	  violence	  has	  been	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  Derry	  and	  North	  Donegal	  based	  Republican	  Action	  Against	  Drugs	  (RAAD).	  As	  their	  name	  suggests	  they	  have	  violently	  targeted	  suspected	  drug	  dealers	  within	  the	  Republican	  communities.	  Up	  to	  2012	  they	  claimed	  responsibility	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  punishment	  shootings,	  pipe-­‐bomb	  attacks,	  expulsions	  and	  assassinations.	  Through	  their	  actions	  and	  statements	  they	  have	  aimed	  to	  simultaneously	  make	  themselves	  indispensable	  within	  the	  Republican	  communities,	  threaten	  those	  partaking	  in	  anti-­‐social	  behaviour	  and	  undermine	  the	  existing	  police	  force,	  as	  is	  displayed	  in	  the	  2010	  statement	  below.	  	  
[PSNI]	  abandoned	  Catholic	  housing	  estates…and	  offer	  
nationalists	  no	  hope…No	  amount	  of	  lofty	  platitudes	  and	  PR	  
stunts	  can	  make	  up	  for	  their	  [PSNI]	  distinct	  lack	  of	  action.	  	  
Anyone	  involved	  in	  anti-­‐community	  activity	  should	  modify	  their	  
behaviour	  or	  face	  the	  harshest	  of	  punishments.	  (The	  Derry	  Journal,	  August	  12th	  2010)	  	  It	  was	  announced	  in	  2012	  that	  RAAD	  had	  merged	  with	  the	  Real	  IRA	  and	  other	  previously	  unaffiliated	  dissident	  Republicans.	  Their	  stated	  aim	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  “unified	  (dissident)	  structure,	  under	  a	  single	  leadership…subservient	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  Irish	  Republican	  Army”	  (McDonald,	  July	  26th,	  2012).	  While	  they	  have	  continued	  the	  terrorist	  activity	  of	  the	  Real	  IRA	  to	  the	  fore	  has	  been	  their	  consistent	  violent	  vigilantism.	  In	  October	  2013	  the	  newly	  merged	  group	  assassinated	  the	  suspected	  criminals	  Barry	  McCory	  and	  Kevin	  Kearney.	  In	  their	  statement	  claiming	  responsibility	  for	  the	  death	  of	  Kearney	  they	  spoke	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  audiences.	  For	  those	  within	  the	  communities	  where	  Kearney	  was	  believed	  to	  have	  operated	  they	  emphasised	  that	  his	  activities	  had	  resulted	  in	  ‘many	  of	  our	  young	  people	  develop(ing)	  drug	  addictions,	  and	  some	  have	  lost	  their	  lives.’	  They	  similarly	  emphasised	  that	  they,	  not	  the	  PSNI,	  would	  ‘not	  allow	  this	  to	  continue’	  (The	  IRA,	  October	  8th,	  2013).	  To	  those	  drug	  dealers	  still	  operating	  within	  the	  communities	  they	  issued	  an	  ultimatum	  that	  ‘they	  have	  48	  hours	  from	  midnight	  to	  cease	  their	  drugs	  activity	  and	  leave	  the	  country’	  (Ibid)	  Finally	  to	  the	  wider	  criminal	  community	  in	  the	  area	  of	  the	  Ardoyne	  where	  Kearney	  was	  executed	  they	  demanded	  that	  they	  ‘cease…activities	  at	  once	  and	  disband,	  you	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  your	  activities	  and	  you	  will	  receive	  no	  further	  warnings’	  (Ibid).	  Through	  their	  actions	  and	  statements	  they	  were	  representing	  their	  former	  comrades	  in	  Sinn	  Fein	  as	  abandoning	  the	  very	  communities	  they	  represent.	  While	  these	  were	  the	  direct	  targets	  the	  statement	  
also	  sent	  a	  message	  to	  security	  establishment	  within	  Northern	  Ireland	  that	  the	  paramilitaries	  were	  doing	  the	  job	  that	  they	  were	  not,	  could	  not,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  doing.	  	  	  As	  the	  importance	  of	  timing	  and	  gradualism	  emphasised	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  vigilantism	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  support	  for	  the	  organisation	  and	  the	  guarantee	  of	  both	  legitimacy	  and	  ultimately	  survival.	  Without	  a	  visible	  enemy	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  for	  such	  an	  organisation	  to	  convince	  others	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  their	  continued	  existence.	  In	  respect	  to	  vigilantism	  if	  this	  is	  to	  be	  successful	  it	  necessitates	  a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  Historically	  throughout	  The	  Troubles	  this	  was	  relatively	  easier.	  The	  British	  Army	  were	  operating	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  the	  towns	  and	  cities	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  and	  the	  PIRA	  were	  able	  to	  portray	  the	  RUC	  as	  an	  unrepresentative	  ‘Protestant’	  police	  force.	  However,	  the	  army	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  presence	  on	  Northern	  Irish	  streets	  and	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  PSNI,	  supported	  by	  Sinn	  Fein,	  the	  police	  service	  is	  now	  more	  representative	  than	  it	  has	  ever	  been	  in	  its	  history.	  The	  dissidents	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  problems	  this	  causes	  them.	  In	  a	  2008	  interview	  with	  journalist	  Suzanne	  Breen	  an	  unnamed	  leader	  of	  the	  Real	  IRA	  stated	  that	  	  
With	  more	  attacks	  on	  the	  RUC/PSNI	  we	  believe	  the	  stage	  will	  be	  
reached	  where	  British	  soldiers	  are	  brought	  back	  onto	  the	  
streets	  to	  bolster	  the	  cops.	  This	  will	  shatter	  the	  façade	  that	  the	  
British	  presence	  has	  gone	  and	  normality	  reigns.	  People	  will	  
once	  again	  be	  made	  visibly	  aware	  that	  we	  remain	  occupied.	  (Breen,	  February	  4th,	  2008)	  
	  An	  organisation	  who	  for	  decades	  had	  been	  fighting	  to	  run	  the	  British	  Army	  off	  the	  streets	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  were	  now	  fighting	  for	  their	  return,	  all	  to	  justify	  their	  own	  continued	  existence	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  their	  existing	  and	  potential	  membership	  and	  support.	  They	  needed	  that	  visible	  enemy.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  central	  aims	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PSNI	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  representative	  police	  force.	  It	  was	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  Patten	  Report	  that	  existing	  Catholic	  police	  officers	  in	  other	  jurisdictions,	  especially	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland,	  should	  be	  approached	  to	  apply	  for	  positions	  in	  the	  new	  police	  force,	  and	  that	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  Catholics	  and	  Protestants	  should	  be	  ‘drawn	  from	  the	  pool	  of	  qualified	  candidates’	  (The	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Policing	  for	  Northern	  Ireland,	  1999	  paras	  15.17	  and	  15.10).	  The	  successful	  implementation	  of	  this	  would	  have	  a	  debilitating	  effect	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  a	  dissident	  vigilante	  presence,	  and	  resultantly	  would	  deteriorate	  their	  support.	  	  	  A	  representative	  police	  force,	  or	  even	  a	  more	  representative	  police	  force,	  would	  negate	  their	  claims	  of	  an	  illegitimate	  police	  force.	  Resultantly	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Sinn	  Fein	  lending	  their	  delayed	  support	  to	  the	  PSNI	  the	  dissidents	  commenced	  an	  unstated	  tactic	  of	  targeting	  Catholic	  recruits.	  For	  those	  who	  naively	  define	  the	  Northern	  Irish	  conflict	  as	  a	  religious	  one	  this	  would	  seem	  counter-­‐intuitive.	  However,	  each	  of	  the	  groups	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  targeting,	  and	  at	  times	  death	  of	  individual	  Catholic	  officers.	  Ronan	  Kerr,	  Stephen	  Carroll,	  Peadar	  Heffron,	  each	  one	  a	  Catholic	  officer	  and	  each	  one	  a	  victim	  of	  dissident	  
paramilitary	  activity.	  As	  with	  all	  acts	  of	  terrorism	  the	  target	  of	  the	  attacks	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  direct	  victims	  and	  their	  families.	  They	  have	  been	  orchestrated	  so	  as	  to	  deter	  a	  further	  influx	  of	  Catholic	  recruits	  and	  to	  deter	  those	  within	  the	  force	  from	  remaining	  involved.	  Similarly	  it	  was	  designed	  to	  highlight	  the	  dissidents’	  deliberate	  disenfranchisement	  from	  the	  strategies	  and	  policies	  of	  Sinn	  Fein.	  For	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  a	  threat	  within	  the	  community	  coupled	  with	  a	  reticence	  to	  trust	  the	  police	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  faith	  in	  their	  abilities	  there	  is	  always	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  existence	  and	  survival	  of	  organised	  vigilantism.	  Therefore	  in	  order	  to	  counter	  this	  the	  wider	  political	  and	  security	  establishment	  must	  strive	  to	  delegitimise	  the	  existence	  of	  these	  groups	  through	  tackling	  each	  of	  these	  three	  strands.	  	  	  	  This	  analysis	  of	  the	  non-­‐political	  illegality	  demonstrates	  that	  we	  need	  to	  look	  outside	  of	  both	  terrorism	  and	  peace	  and	  conflict	  studies	  to	  truly	  understand	  this.	  We	  need	  to	  also	  consider,	  among	  others,	  the	  field	  of	  criminology	  and	  the	  strides	  it	  has	  made.	  While	  this	  clearly	  can	  give	  us	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  non-­‐political	  criminal	  activity,	  such	  as	  vigilantism,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  used	  as	  an	  analytical	  lens	  to	  analyse	  terrorism	  as	  well.	  For	  years	  the	  fields	  of	  criminology	  and	  crime	  sciences	  almost	  entirely	  ignored	  terrorism	  studies	  (LaFree,	  2007;	  Levi,	  Karstedt	  and	  Ruggiero,	  2010),	  and	  terrorism	  researchers	  likewise	  have	  ignored	  the	  benefits	  of	  analysing	  terrorism	  through	  a	  criminological	  spectrum.	  To	  some	  extent	  there	  has	  been	  a	  kind	  of	  terrorism	  studies	  ‘exceptionalism’	  present.	  Analysts	  have	  credited	  terrorism	  as	  being	  somehow	  different	  from	  other	  crimes,	  and	  that	  it	  resultantly	  requires	  a	  separate	  form	  of	  analysis.	  This	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  both	  terrorism	  and	  counter-­‐terrorism,	  its	  high	  levels	  of	  casualties	  or	  its	  significant	  media	  profile.	  But	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  terrorists	  are	  partaking	  in,	  murdering,	  maiming	  and	  threatening	  violence,	  as	  well	  of	  the	  financing	  of	  illegal	  activity	  the	  parallels	  between	  this	  and	  ordinary	  crime	  are	  clear.	  For	  so	  long	  the	  defining	  political	  element	  of	  terrorism	  has	  been	  the	  most	  divisive	  element	  in	  terrorism	  studies.	  Therefore	  by	  stepping	  away	  from	  the	  political	  motivations	  of	  terrorism	  and	  analysing	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  ordinary	  crime	  we	  can	  continue	  to	  make	  significant	  advances.	  These	  advances	  can	  be	  made	  in	  relation	  to	  every	  aspect	  of	  terrorist	  activity	  from	  its	  choice	  and	  location	  of	  targets,	  use	  of	  weapon	  to	  the	  individuals	  and	  groups	  involved,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  rehabilitation.	  	  	  Recent	  years	  have	  seen	  advances	  in	  the	  application	  of	  criminology	  and	  crime	  sciences	  to	  the	  study	  of	  terrorism.	  Institutions	  such	  as	  University	  College	  London,	  University	  of	  Massachusetts	  Lowell	  and	  The	  University	  of	  East	  London	  house	  their	  terrorism	  researchers	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  criminology	  and	  crime	  sciences.	  The	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  research	  National	  Consortium	  for	  the	  Study	  and	  Responses	  to	  Terrorism	  (START)	  is	  led	  by	  Gary	  LaFree,	  a	  criminologist	  by	  training.	  We	  are	  also	  gradually	  seeing	  more	  research	  publications	  on	  terrorism	  being	  published	  by	  criminologists,	  or	  those	  using	  criminological	  methodologies	  and	  theories.	  By	  having	  this	  criminological	  analysis	  of	  terrorism	  being	  carried	  out	  in	  parallel	  to	  the	  political,	  conflict	  and	  peace	  studies	  analyses	  we	  will	  gradually	  approach	  the	  sought	  after	  holistic	  understanding.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  criminology	  should	  be	  utilised	  as	  a	  replacement	  for	  all	  other	  disciplines.	  On	  the	  contrary	  this	  should	  be	  applied	  alongside	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  
analysis.	  It	  is	  not	  in	  competition	  with	  any	  other	  field,	  but	  is	  adding	  a	  separate	  component	  to	  our	  analysis.	  
Conclusion	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  to	  highlight	  that	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  understand	  and	  ultimately	  tackle	  terrorism	  and	  terrorist	  groups	  we	  sometimes	  need	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  violence,	  and	  the	  terrorist	  violence	  specifically.	  If	  one	  was	  to	  focus	  purely	  on	  the	  ‘terrorist’	  activity	  of	  these	  groups	  they	  could	  potentially	  overlook	  the	  wider	  activity	  of	  the	  group.	  The	  chapter	  has	  taken	  two	  disparate	  issues,	  paramilitary	  vigilantism	  and	  the	  gradualism	  of	  change,	  to	  highlight	  this	  argument.	  What	  ties	  both	  of	  these	  issues	  together	  is	  the	  organisations’	  continuous	  venture	  for	  survival	  and	  legitimacy.	  It	  is	  essential	  that	  if	  we	  are	  to	  continue	  in	  developing	  our	  understanding	  of	  terrorism	  and	  terrorists15	  that	  our	  questions	  are	  not	  constrained	  to	  ‘why	  do	  people	  engage	  in	  political	  violence?’	  We	  must	  diversify	  our	  questions,	  and	  open	  our	  minds	  up	  to	  the	  wider	  scope	  of	  involvement	  in	  a	  terrorist	  group	  and	  terrorist	  activity.	  We	  must	  continue	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  roles,	  intentions	  and	  personalities	  of	  those	  we	  would	  readily	  classify	  as	  being	  a	  terrorist.	  It	  is	  paramount	  that	  our	  understanding	  of	  a	  group	  is	  not	  defined	  by	  their	  ‘headline’	  goals	  or	  the	  labels	  we	  assign	  them.	  We	  must	  look	  in-­‐depth	  at	  the	  entire	  breadth	  of	  their	  activity	  and	  goals.	  	  	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  moving	  into	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  periods	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  The	  structures	  of	  society	  have	  been	  established,	  and	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  accepted.	  It	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  political	  representatives	  and	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  final	  outstanding	  issues	  are	  resolved.	  However,	  it	  is	  imperative	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  that	  as	  much	  time	  as	  is	  needed	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  resolution	  is	  taken.	  It	  will	  amount	  to	  nothing	  if	  it	  is	  only	  the	  political	  representatives	  who	  agree	  to	  any	  resolution.	  It	  is	  more	  important	  that	  they	  can	  bring	  base	  with	  them	  in	  support.	  With	  respect	  to	  violent	  dissident	  republicanism	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  threat	  they	  pose	  will	  continue	  to	  rise.	  2016	  will	  mark	  the	  centenary	  of	  the	  1916	  Easter	  Rising	  in	  which	  the	  Irish	  Republican	  forefathers	  attempted	  to	  overthrow	  British	  rule	  in	  Ireland	  and	  proclaim	  and	  independent	  Irish	  state.	  It	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  dissident	  groups	  to	  re-­‐establish	  their	  legitimacy	  and	  portray	  the	  continued	  necessity	  of	  paramilitary	  republicanism	  to	  achieve	  their	  overall	  aim	  of	  a	  united	  Ireland.	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  a	  country	  predominantly	  at	  peace.	  However,	  this	  is	  a	  peace	  which	  has	  “come	  dropping	  slow.’’	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